Evidence comparison
Amazon Web Services and Google Cloud Platform: what the public record shows about each
Both products turn up on cloud and sovereign cloud shortlists, so this page puts their two evidence records next to each other: 48 items on Amazon Web Services and 55 on Google Cloud Platform, each one linked to the source it came from. It does not name a winner, and the section below explains why the numbers cannot be subtracted from one another.
Read the counts correctly
More advisories does not mean less secure. A vulnerability register records what researchers found and what the vendor disclosed. A product deployed in thousands of organisations with a mature disclosure process accumulates far more entries than a product nobody audits. A low count can mean a small install base, a young product or a vendor that publishes little, and a high count often marks the opposite.
The two counts are not measured with equal precision. An advisory is only listed against a vendor when the register ties it to one of its products by name, and vendors differ enormously in how consistently their products are named. Here that gap is 29 unattributable entries for Amazon Web Services against 9 for Google Cloud Platform, which moves the advisory row far more than the products do. Both numbers are in the table so the difference is visible rather than hidden.
Treat this page as two records shown together, never as one score minus another.
The two records side by side
| Measure | Amazon Web Services | Google Cloud Platform |
|---|---|---|
| Evidence items in the recordSize of the record, not a quality signal. | 48 | 55 |
| Kinds of source | 5 | 5 |
| Advisories attributed to the vendor's productsCounts scrutiny and deployment breadth. See the caution above. | 0 | 31 |
| Register entries that could not be attributedEntries naming the vendor that could not be tied to one of its products, so they are excluded from the row above. Read the two rows together: where this number is high, the registers describe that vendor's products less consistently, and the advisory count above says more about naming than about the product. | 29 | 9 |
| Of those, in the CISA known-exploited catalogueExploitation observed in the wild. The one count worth reading closely. | 0 | 0 |
| Share from government registers | 60% | 85% |
| Share the vendor cannot edit | 98% | 100% |
| Public practitioner threadsReflects community size as much as product behaviour. | 10 | 0 |
| Most recent entry | Jul 28, 2026 | Jul 14, 2026 |
| Sources last re-queried | Jul 28, 2026 | Jul 17, 2026 |
Where each record comes from
The registers and platforms behind each column, with the body that operates each one. A record resting on government registers carries different weight from one resting on the vendor's own documentation, which is why this is shown per vendor rather than merged.
Amazon Web Services
| Source | Operated by | Classification | Items | Latest |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| European Vulnerability Database | ENISA, European Union | Authoritative | 28 | Jul 01, 2026 |
| CERT-Bund security advisories | BSI, Federal Republic of Germany | Authoritative | 1 | Oct 31, 2024 |
| Engineering discussions | Hacker News, public threads | Independent | 16 | May 24, 2026 |
| Analyst, review and reference sources | Recognised analysts, review marketplaces and technology press | Independent | 2 | Jul 28, 2026 |
| The vendor's own documentation | Vendor website, indexed by nexalign | Vendor-controlled | 1 | Jun 15, 2026 |
Google Cloud Platform
| Source | Operated by | Classification | Items | Latest |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CERT-Bund security advisories | BSI, Federal Republic of Germany | Authoritative | 20 | Jul 14, 2026 |
| European Vulnerability Database | ENISA, European Union | Authoritative | 19 | Jul 13, 2026 |
| National Vulnerability Database | NIST, United States Department of Commerce | Authoritative | 8 | Jul 13, 2026 |
| Engineering discussions | Hacker News, public threads | Independent | 6 | Apr 08, 2026 |
| Analyst, review and reference sources | Recognised analysts, review marketplaces and technology press | Independent | 2 | Jun 19, 2026 |
Documented vulnerabilities
Only entries tied to a product of the named vendor by a structural signal are listed: an advisory reference on the vendor's own domain, the vendor as the assigning authority, or the affected product list naming it. Entries that merely mention a vendor in passing are excluded from both columns.
Amazon Web Services
Google Cloud Platform
- WID-SEC-2026-2297highCVSS 9.9Jul 14, 2026
Affected products: Google Cloud Platform
- CVE-2026-14934criticalCVSS 9.4Jul 13, 2026
A Missing Authorization vulnerability in the repository creation functionality in Google Cloud BigQuery, Dataform and Colab Enterprise, in the versions between October 2025 and May 10th…
- CVE-2026-12879mediumCVSS 5.9Jul 09, 2026
An Improper Input Validation vulnerability in BigQuery DAO in Google Cloud Apigee versions prior to 2026-06-12 on Google Cloud Platform allows an authenticated attacker to exfiltrate…
- WID-SEC-2026-2009highCVSS 8.8Jul 02, 2026
Affected products: Amazon Linux 2, Fedora Linux, SUSE openSUSE, Google Cloud Platform
- WID-SEC-2026-2087highCVSS 8.7Jun 26, 2026
Affected products: Google Cloud Platform
- CVE-2026-4764criticalCVSS 9.4Jun 11, 2026
A Missing Authorization vulnerability in the playbook import functionality in Dialogflow CX on Google Cloud Platform allows an authenticated user with specific roles to escalate privileges…
What practitioners report
Public threads naming each product in their own title. Not curated for sentiment, and not counted as a verdict: a loud thread is one team's experience, not a measurement.
Amazon Web Services
- Hacker NewsMay 24, 2026Independent
Amazon Web Services – Four Years and Out
- Hacker NewsFeb 21, 2026Independent
An AI coding bot took down Amazon Web Services
- Hacker NewsFeb 20, 2026Independent
An AI coding bot took down Amazon Web Services
- Hacker NewsOct 20, 2025Independent
How much Anthropic and Cursor spend on Amazon Web Services
- Hacker NewsAug 07, 2025Independent
Amazon Web Services gives the Trump admin $1B coupon
Google Cloud Platform
What neither record can tell you
The two lists below are the honest holes in each record. Everything a choice between these two actually turns on sits outside both of them.
Amazon Web Services
- 29 register entries mention Amazon Web Services, but none of them could be attributed to a product of Amazon Web Services. They describe other vendors' software and are not shown here.
- Pricing, contract terms, notice periods and support commitments are not part of any public register. They come from the vendor and belong in a negotiation record.
- Certification status such as ISO 27001, SOC 2 or BSI C5 has to be checked against the current certificate and its stated scope. A valid certificate can still exclude the product being bought.
Google Cloud Platform
- A further 9 register entries mention Google Cloud Platform without naming a product of Google Cloud Platform as affected. They are excluded rather than counted as vulnerabilities.
- No public practitioner discussion naming Google Cloud Platform was found in the indexed threads. Operational experience with this product is not represented in this record.
- Pricing, contract terms, notice periods and support commitments are not part of any public register. They come from the vendor and belong in a negotiation record.
- Certification status such as ISO 27001, SOC 2 or BSI C5 has to be checked against the current certificate and its stated scope. A valid certificate can still exclude the product being bought.
Whether Amazon Web Services is the right choice is not on this page
A record of what is true about a vendor is one half of a decision. The other half is your context: which criteria matter, how heavily each one weighs, what is a hard no, and who has to sign the result off. No public page can know that, and any page that claims to rank vendors for you is guessing at it.
Typical criteria for this category
Needs your case- Data Sovereignty & Residencyweight
- Certifications (BSI C5, ISO 27001, SOC 2)weight
- Scalability & Performanceweight
- Migration Complexityweight
- Vendor Lock-in Riskweight
Criteria shown as examples for cloud and sovereign cloud. Weighting and fit are properties of your decision, not of the vendor, so they are not published here.
What DecisionOS adds on top of this record
- The vendor scored against your criteria with your weighting, not against a generic ranking
- A dealbreaker check against your hard constraints: data residency, contract terms, existing stack
- A side-by-side view of the alternatives on your shortlist, built from this same evidence pool
- This evidence mapped onto your compliance scope: NIS2, DORA, ISO 27001, SOC 2
- A decision memo your board can read, with the trade-offs and the reasoning on the record
Questions this page answers
Which is better, Amazon Web Services or Google Cloud Platform?
This page does not answer that, and no public page can. Better exists only relative to a decision: which criteria matter, how heavily each weighs, what counts as a dealbreaker and which systems the product has to live next to. What this page gives you is the evidence on both, 48 items on Amazon Web Services and 55 on Google Cloud Platform, each with its source, so the judgement rests on the record rather than on marketing.
Does Amazon Web Services or Google Cloud Platform have more vulnerabilities?
Google Cloud Platform currently has 31 attributed advisories in this record and Amazon Web Services has 0. That comparison is easy to misread. A vulnerability register records what researchers found and what the vendor disclosed, so a widely deployed product with an active disclosure process accumulates more entries than one nobody audits. A low count can equally mean a small install base or a vendor that publishes little. The two figures are also not measured with equal precision: an advisory only counts here when a register ties it to a named product, and 29 entries naming Amazon Web Services and 9 naming Google Cloud Platform could not be tied to one. The count worth reading closely is how many entries appear in the CISA catalogue of known exploited vulnerabilities, which is 0 for Amazon Web Services and 0 for Google Cloud Platform.
How independent is the evidence on Amazon Web Services and Google Cloud Platform?
98 percent of the Amazon Web Services record and 100 percent of the Google Cloud Platform record come from sources the vendor does not control: government vulnerability registers, public practitioner threads and a fixed list of recognised analysts and technology press. Material either vendor publishes about itself stays in the record and is labelled as a claim.
What does this comparison of Amazon Web Services and Google Cloud Platform leave out?
Pricing, contract terms, notice periods, support commitments and the current scope of any certificate. None of those appear in a public register; they come from the vendor and belong in a negotiation record. Fit with your existing stack and your compliance scope is also absent, because it is a property of your organisation rather than of a cloud and sovereign cloud product.
Why does nexalign publish this instead of ranking Amazon Web Services and Google Cloud Platform?
Because a ranking would have to invent the buyer. Every quadrant and score sheet silently assumes a weighting that belongs to someone else's decision. nexalign publishes the record and keeps the weighting where it belongs, in DecisionOS, where it is set by the people who have to defend the outcome.
The full records
Amazon Web Services: the full evidence record
48 items from 5 kinds of source
Google Cloud Platform: the full evidence record
55 items from 5 kinds of source
Two records do not make a decision
Choosing between Amazon Web Services and Google Cloud Platform depends on which criteria matter to you, how heavily each one weighs, what your hard constraints are and who has to sign the result off. DecisionOS takes this same evidence pool, scores it against the criteria of your actual decision and produces a memo that holds up in front of a board and an auditor.